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Abstract
In this paper we conduct a within-subjects experiment in which teenagers go over 256
gambles with real money gains and losses. For each risky gamble they choose whether to
participate in it, or pass. Prior to this main experiment subjects identify specific songs
belonging to their favorite musical genre, as well as songs representing a style they dislike.
In the main experiment we vary the music playing in the background, so that each subject
hears some of their favorite music, and some disliked music, alternating in blocks of 16
gambles. We find that favorite music increases risk-taking (‘risk on’), and disliked music
suppresses risk-taking (‘risk off’), compared to a baseline of no music. Literature in psychol-
ogy proposes several mechanisms by which mood affects risk-taking, but none of them fully
explain the results in our setting. The results are, however, consistent with the economics
notion of preference complementarity, extended to the domain of risk preference. The pref-
erence structure implied by our results is more complex than previously thought, yet realis-
tic, and consistent with recent theoretical models. More generally, this mechanism offers a
potential explanation to why risk-taking is known to change over time and across contexts.
Introduction
Economics aspires to explain human behavior by the notion of individual utility maximization.
While many specifications of utility functions have been used, some of which lead to what
seems like strange or even unwise behavior, economists nevertheless tend to assume that an
individual’s chosen actions follow their best self-interest. For example, in a classical paper
Becker and Murphy explain behavior such as the use of heroin in a rational utility-maximizing
framework [1]. Psychological approaches to decision-making, on the other hand, tend to
assume that people make mistakes, and can thus choose what is not in their best self-interest.
The topic of decision-making under risk, in particular, has seen an increasing number of stud-
ies in both camps. The interest is largely driven by the finding that risk preferences seem to be
unstable across contexts [2–3]. This instability can be due to a behavioral bias, such as a fram-
ing effect [4–5], or driven by mood effects [6–7]. Alternatively, seemingly inconsistent behavior
could at least partly be due to preference interactions [8–11]. Simple examples of preference
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interactions are pairs of complementary consumption goods, such as french fries and ketchup,
or coffee and cream. Analogously in the context of risk-taking, a decision to take risk could
give more (or less) utility depending on simultaneously experienced utility from other sources.
In this paper we introduce the idea of preference interactions as an explanation to changing
risk-taking behavior, and utilize an experimental setup that helps disentangling the preference-
based explanation from the alternative explanation of a psychological bias. Such risk preference
interactions may be particularly relevant in domains that simultaneously involve risky deci-
sions and entertainment value. Examples include gambling, extreme sports, and recreational
driving by young adults. In finance, active yet unprofitable trading by some individual investors
fits this description [12–14].
To test for preference interactions in risk-taking we utilize the revealed preference of each
subject for selecting stimuli, which in the context of our experiment is music. By necessity, we
employ a within-subject experimental setting, which also gives more power to identify the
effect compared to a between-subjects design. As experimental subjects we recruited 25 teenag-
ers, aged between 12 and 17 years. The number of subjects is in the typical range among deci-
sion-making studies that require subject-specific arrangements. The ample within-subject
variation that is available provides enough power to identify the effects we are testing for. We
chose teenagers for two reasons. First, we expected them to be good at explicitly identifying
their specific musical taste. Several authors (see, e.g. [15–16]) consider teenagers the most
fanatic music adepts of all age groups. For example, British adolescents to listen to music for an
average of 2.5 hours per day [17]. For these reasons, teenagers may have more polarized, or at
least more clearly defined musical tastes. However, this does not necessarily mean that the
effects would be weaker with adults–music may even be more significant later in life [18–19].
Second, it is easier to create effective monetary incentives due to the subjects’ low level of
income. The loss amounts from a single gamble ranged from 0.5 to 2 euros, and the win
amounts ranged from 2 to 4 euros. These amounts are roughly comparable to a couple of days’
worth of disposable income for the average subject.
Prior to the main experiment, each subject identifies four pieces of what they consider
their favorite music, as well as four musical pieces that they dislike. In this data several artists
appeared on both ends of the preference scale, depending on the subject. For example, rap art-
ists such as 50 Cent and Eminem were featured as the preferred music for some subjects, while
at the same time representing most disliked music of some other subjects. The same is true also
for pop / R&B artist Rihanna and the hard rock band Guns N’ Roses: they were among the
favorites as well as the most disliked artists. Music by these artists appears to affect different
people in different ways, consistent with [20–21]. Most important for our purposes, we know
exactly which musical pieces each subject likes, and what they dislike. We utilize this revealed
preference in the main experiment in connection to risky choice.
In the main experiment we measure risk-taking using binary-outcome, constant probability
(50–50) gambles. We alternated the music being played in the background while the subjects
were choosing whether to participate in the gambles. Each subject was played music from their
personal favorites list (4 different songs), as well as music that they despised (4 different songs).
In addition to the liked and disliked music, choices were also made under silence. We also var-
ied the gain and loss payoffs of the gambles. This resulted in variation in the expected values of
the gambles as the probabilities were held fixed. Each subject went through 256 gambles with
different payoffs, and we identify the effects from within-subject variation in the gamble accep-
tance rates.
We find that favorite music increases risk-taking, and disliked music depresses risk-taking
relative to the baseline of no music. The musical style per se does not matter for risk-taking.
Rather, the key factor is whether or not the subject’s personal musical taste and the music
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playing in the background are congruent. The frequency for accepting a gamble is 54.1% for
favorite music versus 47.4% for disliked music. When no music was playing the acceptance
rate is 51.4%. The effects of music are evident in all kinds of gambles but the difference in
acceptance rates in favor of liked versus disliked music is greatest (about 10 percentage points)
when unconditional acceptance rates are around 50%, which happens with a ratio of gains to
losses around 2:1 (see Fig 1). The positive effect of favorite music and the negative effect of dis-
liked music are both statistically significant at the 5% level under various alternative estimation
methods. In particular, they are present in a logit regression with subject fixed effects, in a ran-
dom effects regression including surveyed subjective risk attitude as a control variable, and in
the distribution of coefficients from subject specific regressions, when controlling for the gain
and loss amounts of the gambles.
These results are consistent with preference interactions of the type described by [8–10] and
imply that such effects can extend to risk preference, in addition to preferences for consump-
tion goods. It appears as if listening to preferred type of music increases the marginal utility of
money. Such preference structures can create behavior that is observationally equivalent to
unstable preferences when viewed through the standard economic model in which the mar-
ginal propensity to take risk is independent of utility derived from other sources. However,
time varying risk-taking behavior can be consistent with utility maximizing behavior in a more
complex preference structure. In subsequent work involving neuroimaging methods, we find
that the behavioral effect of music on risk-taking co-varied with brain activation in amygdala
and dorsal striatum [22]. This evidence is consistent with our preference-based interpretation
as these brain areas are known to be key components of the value computation and coding of
preference information [23–24]. The preference-based interpretation is also consistent with
the neuroimaging results of [25] showing that the activation in the reward areas of the brain
are proportional to subjective ratings of music.
Fig 1. Gamble acceptance rates. Acceptance rates under liked music (black solid line) and disliked music
(gray solid line), and their difference (dotted line) as a function of the win-loss–ratio of the gambles. The win-
loss–ratio is formed by dividing the potential win amount by the potential loss amount.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0135436.g001
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A justified question is whether the results could arise through decision-psychologic
influences, as opposed to preference interactions. Prior research has proposed at least four
mechanisms that mediate the effect of mood on risk-taking: mood maintenance hypothesis,
subjective probability weighting, affect infusion, and impact on cognitive processing strategies.
We defer a more detailed discussion of the psychological mechanisms to the discussion sec-
tion of the paper, where we argue that none of these theories can adequately account for our
findings.
Methods
We recruited 25 adolescents (aged 12–17 years, 12 males, 13 females) in Helsinki, Finland, by
announcing an invitation to participate in an experiment that concerns music and attitude
towards monetary gains and losses. Participants were told that the experiment consists of two
separate sessions (S1 Experimental Instructions). For the first session they were asked to select,
and bring with them four pieces of their favorite music and four pieces of music they disliked
(on music CDs or mp3-files). We recognize the possibility that locating and bringing in the dis-
liked music requires more effort than to do the same for favorite music. If this is the case the
impact of disliked music could be understated in our empirical tests.
The announcement also explained the payment structure: the subjects would be paid 10
euros for participating in the first session, while earnings in the second session would depend
on the decisions they make during the experiment as well as chance outcomes. The subjects
could either win or lose money in the second session. We adopted this two-session structure
based on the recommendation by [26]. The idea is to make the subjects feel that they would
face actual potential losses in the gambles, and less likely to feel as if they were “gambling with
the house money”. The maximum amount that the subjects could win was 20 euros, and the
maximum amount they could lose was 10 euros. A written informed consent was solicited
from the subjects’ parents prior to the experiment.
Session 1
The eight pieces of music that each subject brought with them were first copied onto a com-
puter for later use in the second session. The subjects then filled out a questionnaire surveying
their risk attitude and some background information. The date of the second session was
agreed on, leaving at least one week between the sessions. The fixed payment of 10 euros was
paid and the subjects were reminded that in the second session they would participate in a
computerized experiment in which one can either win or lose money.
Session 2
In the main experiment, which took place after at least a week had passed since session 1, the
task of subjects was to accept or reject gambles that offered a 50–50 chance to win or lose
money. Accepting a gamble, for example [1.50, –1.20], meant that the subject was willing to
participate in a gamble that offered a 50% change of winning 1.50 euros and a 50% chance of
losing 1.20 euros. The experiment was conducted individually in a private room using a com-
puter program. Fig 2A shows the computer screen plot for the aforementioned example. The
gain and loss amounts were shown for 2.5 seconds, after which the subjects had 2.5 seconds to
choose “accept” or “reject” by pressing designated buttons on the computer keyboard. After
deciding on the gamble, there was a break of 0.5 to 3.5 seconds until the next gamble was
shown. We varied the length of this break to avoid unreflected automatic responses and to
keep the subjects focused.
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The results of the gambles were not shown during the course of the experiment. Knowledge
on prior gains or losses can influence behavior [4, 27]. While these effects are interesting in
their own right, for the purposes of this paper they represent a confounding effect that we
wanted to avoid. At the start of the experiment the subjects were informed that five randomly
determined gambles would be played for real at the end of the session. There were 16 different
win outcomes ranging from 1 to 4 euros, and 16 loss outcomes ranging from 0.5 to 2 euros.
Each subject went through the full payoff matrix and none of the gambles were repeated. This
corresponds to 16 x 16 = 256 gambles (Fig 2B).
Gambles were presented under three conditions: while the subjects’ favorite music was play-
ing (64 gambles), while disliked music was playing (64 gambles), and gambles with no music
playing (128 gambles). Sixteen gambles under one condition were assembled into a block of
80 second duration. Each block of music was followed by a block without music. The order of
Fig 2. The financial decisionmaking task. (A) Exemplary computer screen plot from the experiment. The
task of the subjects was to accept or reject gambles that offered a 50–50 chance of gaining or losing money.
Gains ranged from 1 to 4 euros and losses from 0.5 to 2 euros. (B) The payoff matrix comprised 256 different
gambles. The 256 gambles were divided into 16 sets of 16 gambles each. Within a set, the 16 gambles were
scattered around the payoff matrix such that only one gamble came from each of the separate 4 by 4 areas in
the matrix. The two different shades of grey rectangles in the figure represent two examples of a set of
gambles. (C) Subjects played 16 different blocks, 16 gambles in each block, and a block with music was
always followed by a block without music. To keep subjects’ attention high and to avoid unreflected automatic
response we varied the length of the interval between the gambles (from 0.5 to 3.5 seconds).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0135436.g002
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blocks was either L-L-D-D-L-L-D-D- or D-D-L-L-D-D-L-L- (where L stands for liked music, D
for disliked music, and—for no music), counterbalanced across subjects (Fig 2C). During all con-
ditions gambles were randomly drawn from the payoff matrix. We applied random sampling
that ensured an even mix of different types of gambles under all three conditions (Fig 2B).
The complete session lasted about 40 minutes. At the end, five gambles were randomly
drawn, and the ones that the subject had accepted were played for real. Payoffs were deter-
mined by the roll of a dice (values of one to three indicated a loss, and four to six indicated a
win). The average total payment was 13.80 euros (SD = 3.93) which is, according to our survey,
somewhat more than the average weekly disposable income for our subjects.
The data of two subjects were discarded: one due to misunderstanding the task, and one due
to a technical error with the music that was played. The analysis is thus based on data for 23
subjects, 12 females and 11 males, mean age 14.6 years, SD = 1.62, range 12–17 years.
Main Results
In the first session of the experiment, the subjects filled a questionnaire where we surveyed
their risk attitude. They first rated their general willingness to take risk on a visual analog scale,
that is, by indicating a position along a horizontal line, 10 cm in length, with the end-points
labeled ‘Not willing to take risk’ and ‘Completely willing to take risk’. The distribution of the
responses to the general risk question is depicted in Fig 3A. The average willingness to take risk
was 5.07 (SD = 1.92).
A risk neutral subject would be indifferent between participating in and rejecting a gamble
with a win-loss ratio of 1:1. Even a normal risk-averse decision maker, provided that he or she
is optimizing lifetime consumption and is not pathologically risk-averse, would accept a small-
scale gamble as long as the win-loss–ratio is slightly over 1 [28]. However, experimental studies
show that people generally tend to be more sensitive to losses than to gains (loss aversion).
Indifference between accepting and declining equiprobable binomial gambles typically obtains
when the ratio of the win amount to the loss amount is 2:1 [29–30]. Fig 3B illustrates the distri-
bution of the acceptance rates for the gambles for different combinations of gains and losses
in our experiment. The acceptance rates are around 50% along the diagonal where the ratio
of the win amount to the amount of loss is 2:1, and decrease when moving towards less favor-
able gambles. These results show that our adolescent subjects do not differ from the general
Fig 3. Risk attitude andmean acceptance rates. (A) The distribution of risk attitude; 0 = not willing to take risk, 10 = completely willing to take risk. The
average willingness to take risk was 5.07 (SD = 1.92). (B) Payoff matrix and mean acceptance rates, all gambles.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0135436.g003
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population in their degree of loss aversion, even if adolescents are known to engage in some
types of risky activities more often than adults [31].
Table 1 shows the impact of music on the tendency to participate in gambles. Univariate
results reported in Panel A show that the frequency for accepting a gamble is 47.4% for disliked
music versus 54.1% for favorite music. When no music was playing the acceptance rate is
51.4%. Favorite music thus alleviates, and disliked music exacerbates loss aversion. Fig 1 graphs
the acceptance rates as a function of the win-loss–ratios of the gambles. The effect of music is
evident in all kinds of gambles. The difference in acceptance rates in favor of liked versus dis-
liked music is about 10 percentage points along the diagonal of the payoff matrix, that is, when
the ratio of gains to losses is 2:1 (Fig 4). The mean effects of favorite and disliked music, com-
pared to no music, are statistically significant at the 5% level under various estimation methods
which we describe in detail in the multivariate analysis section.
One way of judging the magnitude of these effects is to consider an offsetting change in a
gamble’s loss amount that is needed for keeping the acceptance rate statistically equal, while
music is being varied. Calculated in this way, liked music offsets a 3.1% increase in the loss
amount, and disliked music offsets a 4.6% reduction in the loss amount. These magnitudes are
economically relevant. The effect varies for different types of gambles. Liked music only slightly
further increases acceptance rates among the most favorable gambles (above the payoff matrix
diagonal) where acceptance rates are already high, but disliked music still further lowers the
acceptance rates in the least favorable gambles (below the payoff matrix diagonal). In these
least favorable gambles the acceptance rate is only 16%. However, the impact of music, again
judged against an offsetting loss amount, is very large: a change of 25–30% in the loss amount
is required to statistically offset the impact of either liked or disliked music on the acceptance
Table 1. The effect of music on risk-taking, statistical tests.
Panel A. Favorite music No music Disliked music
Mean acceptance rates 0.541 0.514 0.474
Difference compared to ‘No music’ 0.027 -0.040
Difference between ‘Favorite music’ and ‘Disliked music’ 0.067
Panel B. Regressions with all subjects Favorite music Disliked music
Linear probability model (OLS) 0.034** -0.034**
2.16 -2.16
OLS with subject ﬁxed effects 0.034** -0.033**
2.32 -2.31
Logit, conditional subject ﬁxed effects 0.167*** -0.165***
3.04 -3.32
Logit, subject random effects 0.167*** -0.165***
2.84 -3.36
Panel C. Subject-speciﬁc logit regressions Favorite music Disliked music
Mean coefﬁcient 0.169** -0.168**
2.51 -2.62
Panel A shows the mean acceptance rates of binary gambles in which subjects (N = 23) could either win or lose money with equal probability. The
number of observations for each subject is 256, of which 128 are for ‘No music’, 64 are for ‘Favorite music’, and 64 are for ‘Disliked music’. Panel B
shows results from four different regression models testing the effect of the musical condition on the decision to accept the gamble. T-statistics (z-statistics
for logit regressions) are presented below the coefﬁcients. In calculating the t-statistics we use standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity in all analyses.
For ﬁxed effects and random effects models such standard errors are obtained with bootstrapping. Panel C shows results from running separate Logit
regressions for each subject (256 observations in each regression), and taking averages of the subject-speciﬁc coefﬁcients. The t-statistics in Panel C are
from a standard t-test of means. All regressions include the expected value of the gamble as a control variable (not reported). Statistical signiﬁcance at the
5% and 1% level are indicated by ** and ***.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0135436.t001
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rate. These results suggest that musical taste may interact with taste for risk particularly
strongly in high-risk situations.
The effect magnitudes are similar for both genders, and the difference between favorite and
disliked music statistically significant (p-value 0.01). Boys were slightly more influenced by dis-
liked music, and girls slightly more influenced by favorite music, but these differences are not
significant. The unconditional acceptance rate declines over the course of the experiment in an
approximately linear fashion through blocks 1 to 16. It is 52.0% on average for the first half
(blocks 1–8), and falls to 45.8% for the second half (blocks 9–16). This may reflect decision
fatigue, and the associated tendency to ‘do nothing’, which in our experimental setup favors
declining the gamble. It can also be due to a kind of mental risk budgeting: as the experiment
progresses the subjects may start feeling that they have already taken enough risk, though in
reality the risks do not accumulate in this way: only a fixed number is being played out for real
at the end. Also the effect of music is slightly reduced for the latter half, but it nevertheless
remains marginally significant (p-value 0.07) even when the sample size is cut in half.
Multivariate Analysis
To assess the statistical significance and robustness of the result we estimate three types of
regression models and implement two alternative assumptions about unobserved heterogene-
ity. We estimate all regressions with maximum likelihood and use standard errors that are
robust to heteroskedasticity. Using all methods we find that subjectively liked music increases
risk-taking, while disliked music decreases risk-taking, and the results are statistically signifi-
cant at the 1–5% level.
We start by estimating the propensity to accept a gamble using a linear probability model
(OLS regression). The dependent variable yij is a binary choice variable representing an accep-
tance (“1”) or a rejection (“0”) of gamble j 2 {1,. . .,256} by subject i 2 {1,. . .,23} and the model
is
yij ¼ aþ bEEj þ bGGij þ bBBij þ εij ð1Þ
where Ej is the expected value of gamble j, Gij and Bij are zero-one indicator variables for
Fig 4. Interaction betweenmusic and risk taking. Payoff matrix and mean acceptance rates in two conditions: subjectively disliked music and liked music.
In a 2 by 4 by 4 ANOVA (music, gain, loss), the main effect of music (disliked vs. liked) on the mean acceptance rate was statistically significant (F(1,22) =
12.04, p = 0.002), likewise main effects of gain (F(3,66) = 102.04, p < 0.001) and loss (F(3,66) = 94.47, p < 0.001). As expected, the interaction was between
gain and loss was significant (F(9,198) = 5.09, p < 0.001); none of the interactions with music was significant.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0135436.g004
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subjectively liked (“Good”) and disliked (“Bad”) music, respectively, being played while subject
i was considering gamble j. The betas, β, represent the coefﬁcients to be estimated with sub-
scripts corresponding to the variables, and α is the constant term. As an alternative speciﬁca-
tion to using the expected value, E, to model the attractiveness of the gamble we include the
amount to win and the amount to lose as two separate variables in all the models. The results
are similar. Panel B of Table 1 reports the results from estimating (1), yielding coefﬁcients of
0.034 for G (t-value 2.16) and –0.034 for B (t-value –2.16).
We then add subject specific regression constants, i.e., estimate a fixed effects linear proba-
bility model
yij ¼ aþ bEEj þ bGGij þ bBBij þ cj þ εij ð2Þ
where ci is the subject speciﬁc regression constant which captures between-subject variation in
the tendency to participate in the gambles. Estimating (2), as reported in Panel B of Table 1,
yields coefﬁcients of 0.034 for G (t-value 2.32) and –0.033 for B (t-value –2.31).
An analysis of a dichotomous dependent variable is frequently conducted with a logit
model, an approach that we also follow. However, the interpretation of coefficients is less
straightforward, and fixed effects estimation may cause problems, compared to the linear prob-
ability model. Our logit model relates the probability of subject i accepting gamble j to the
explanatory variables as follows
ln
pij
1 pij
 !
¼ aþ bEEj þ bGGij þ bBBij þ εij ð3Þ
where pij is the probability that yij = 1 conditional on the explanatory variables. We estimate
two types of unobserved effects models.
First, a conditional fixed effects logit which additionally conditions the probabilities on a
subject specific count of accepted gambles Yi ¼
P256
j¼1 yij. We obtain robust standard errors by
bootstrapping (50 repetitions). Panel B of Table 1 shows coefﬁcients of 0.167 for G (z-value
3.04) and –0.165 for B (z-value –3.32).
Second, we estimate a subject random effects model. Maximum likelihood gives consistent
and efficient estimates of a random effects model assuming that the unobserved effects do not
correlate with the explanatory variables. As a control variable we include the subjects’ general
risk attitude that was surveyed in the first part of the experiment, about a week prior to the
main experiment. In this model we effectively assume that the probability of subject i accepting
gamble j is as follows
pijðyj ¼ 1Þ ¼ f ðEj;Gij;Bij;Ri; aiÞ ð4Þ
i.e., related to gamble characteristics, Ej, the musical condition prevailing during the decision,
Gij and Bij, the subject’ general risk attitude, Ri, as well as the subject speciﬁc random effect, αi,
and that the random effect remaining after controlling for Ri is independent of the explanatory
variables. One can think of these random effects as deviations from the subjects’ baseline risk
attitude, arising from day-to-day variation, or from differences in context speciﬁc reactions.
We again use bootstrapped standard errors. Panel B of Table 1 shows coefﬁcients of 0.167 for
G (z-value 2.84) and –0.165 for B (z-value –3.36).
We also run a standard logit model for each subject separately estimating coefficients for
the musical condition dummies and controlling for the expected value of the gamble. Each
regression thus has 256 observations corresponding to the number of all different gambles. The
coefficients for liked music are positive for 83% of the subjects and the coefficients for disliked
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music are negative for 74% of the subjects. The means of the coefficients across all subjects are
similar to the coefficient estimates obtained by the other methods (0.17 for G and –0.17 for B),
and the median values of the coefficients are somewhat larger in absolute magnitude. We test
for statistical significance of the averages of the individual G and B regression coefficients with
a standard t-test and obtain t-values of 2.51 (for G) and –2.61 (for B). These results are reported
in Panel C of Table 1.
Discussion
This section evaluates potential underlying psychological mechanisms, as well as discusses the
theoretical implications of the results.
Psychological mechanisms
Our thesis in this paper is that a taste of risk in one moment in time is affected by simultaneous
utility from other sources. This is a classical economics-based argument—tastes matter—but
departing from the classical specification of simple one-dimensional utility of wealth. In the
experiment we used music as this other source of utility. A natural question to ask is whether
psychological theories, whereby mood affects risk-taking, could also explain our findings.
Below we consider the most prominent of such theories. While they may have some merit
here, it appears that none can fully account for the effect in our setting. To facilitate the link to
the literature on mood effects, we assume below that listening to favorite music elevates mood,
at least compared to listening to disliked music [22].
Mood maintenance theory—also referred to as mood regulation—says that people in good
mood have more to lose compared to people in bad mood, and thus avoid taking risks with
potential negative consequences that could erode their good mood [32–36]. Contrary to this
idea, we find that people take more risk while listening to their favorite music.
Subjective probability weighting can also be responsible for mood effects in risk-taking.
People on positive moods generally assess bad outcomes as being less likely compared to
people on negative moods [37–38]. Such probability weighting is known to matter at the ends
of the probability scale, and is not an issue with the constant 50% probabilities we use [39–40].
It is thus unlikely that mood changes would impact the perception of probabilities in our
experiment.
The affect infusion model describes the process of selecting, learning, and interpreting new
information about a risky situation, and incorporating it into existing knowledge and experi-
ences [41]. Under this theory, good mood should increase risk-taking if it primes access to
memories of mood congruent outcomes from earlier risky choices. Our simple binomial con-
stant probability gambles do not readily fall under the domain of affect infusion theory as they
do not involve the complex information processing that it assumes.
Mood states can also interplay with the type of cognitive processing strategies utilized,
which might mediate the impact of mood on risk-taking. Specifically, people may be more
likely to employ analytical problem-solving under negative moods, while more likely resorting
to heuristics that lead to behavioral biases under positive moods [42–43]. In contrast to this
idea, we find that subjects listening to their favorite music perform closer to the normative
benchmark of participating in all the gambles. That is, good music makes the subjects less loss-
averse, and less biased in that sense.
Finally, we note that classical Pavlovian conditioning, or a ‘hedonic forecasting mechanism’
leading to a biochemical response to cues and rewards [44–45] is not possible in the context
of our experiment. This is because in our experiment the gambles are only played at the end,
so the outcomes can not affect choices. We nevertheless consider it quite plausible that
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conditioning can contribute to preference formation prior to the experiment. For example,
consider a youngster who ventures to ask a girl of his dreams for a dance while a particular
song is playing. An affirmative response could lead not only to liking the song, but also to asso-
ciating the song with reward from taking risk. In any case, the subjects enter our experiment
endowed with whatever preferences they have, and then behave consistent with preference
interactions, even if Pavlovian conditioning has affected the formation of those preferences at
some point earlier.
The overall conclusion is that prominent psychological theories on mood and risk-taking
do not provide a compelling explanation to our results, at least when considered individually.
However, neither does standard economic theory. The next section concludes by sketching a
potential approach for modeling risk-preference interactions that allows a more general utility
specification, as well as integrating more psychology into it. Incorporating affect infusion strat-
egies and conditioning in a modified form may be fruitful. However, even if the phenomenon
we document is potentially amenable to economic utility-based modeling, a whole other ques-
tion is whether the subjects’ behavior can be explained in terms of utility maximization. Most
axioms of expected utility theory have been violated in experiments ([46–47, 29, 48–51] and
others). The bottom line regarding state-varying risk preferences is that to give expected utility
theory a fighting chance, utility must be correctly specified. It is toward this goal that our paper
takes an important step.
Theoretical implications
How value is encoded in the brain remains a key question in neuroscience, microeconomics,
and the study of learning [52]. Neuroeconomics supports the view that value and thereby pref-
erences are formed as interactions among specialized components in the brain [53–57]. The
relative strength of the activity in different brain areas varies by the type of the evaluation, such
as absolute vs. relative to a reference point, time vs. risk, or undiscounted vs. discounted pay-
offs. It seems plausible that the evaluation of fundamentally different aspects, such as risk and
music, might also modulate brain processes. Given the neuroeconomics view of preference for-
mation, the modulation might then underlie the preference interaction. The neuroimaging
results of [22] are broadly consistent with this conjecture, although they do not specifically test
it.
One possible mediating channel for preference interactions is stress. Music can reduce
stress. For example, the effect has been documented for surgery patients [58]. But music also
has the capability of enhancing stress: experimental subjects playing a violent videogame
(Quake III) with its built-in music turned on, showed a higher blood concentration of stress
hormone cortisol compared to other subjects playing the same game in silence [59]. In risky
decision-making, music and stress have been associated with similar changes in the way that
rewards and punishments are evaluated in the brain [22, 60].
Recent experiments in economics could be interpreted in a preference-interaction frame-
work [61–62]. Subjects viewing a scene from a horror movie choose a significantly lower cer-
tainty equivalent in a hypothetical lottery question [61]. However, this general pattern is
broken when the sample is split by taste for horror movies. Based on the figures reported in the
paper, we calculate that viewing the movie clip decreases the certainty equivalent for those who
dislike horror movies by 35%, but increases the certainty equivalent for those who like horror
movies by 81%, compared to subjects who are indifferent regarding horror movies. The bubble
pattern typically obtained in experimental asset markets is much stronger if subjects had just
viewed an exciting movie clip (vs. a dull documentary or a sad drama clip) before the trading
session [62].
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Some earlier evidence on the effect of music on consumption can also be interpreted as
being supportive of preference interactions. Enjoyable music increases supermarket and restau-
rant sales [63–65]. Consumers also report higher overall satisfaction with their shopping expe-
rience when music and ambient scent in the store are congruent [66–67]. It has been found
that most shoppers selected a French wine when French music was playing, but selected a Ger-
man wine when German music was playing [68]. All these studies are consistent with musical
preference interacting with the utility evaluation in another dimension. Regarding the interac-
tion of music risky and behavior specifically, people increase their driving speed and engage in
more red light violations when high tempo music is playing on the background [69]. However,
driving performance while listening to music can be better for some driving tasks, such as car
following [70].
We conclude this section with a discussion on modeling risk-preference interactions. As a
starting point, consider the standard setup of state dependent utility [71–72]. The decision-
maker’s preferences over uncertain options are said to be state-dependent if the prevailing state
of nature affects his or her evaluation of the consequences. In our case, music constituted a
state of the world which may have influenced the decision-maker’s preferences, for example,
by altering his or her risk attitude. Let us assume that a standard Kahneman and Tversky–type
utility function with a reference point zero represents the preferences or our subjects [29].
Assume further, for simplicity, that the utility function is piecewise linear. Music may then
influence the preferences by changing the slopes of the segments of the utility function. Hence,
hearing favorite music would increase the slope for positive outcomes and decrease the slope
for negative outcomes.
As a slightly more complicated framework, consider the Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and
Rabin–setup of state dependent preferences [11]. The focus in [11] is on prediction errors of
future utility arising from the decision-maker’s incomplete understanding of the effect that the
state has on his or her utility. One could define utility over a gamble, represented by a probabil-
ity distribution of outcomes, x, and music,m, as U(x,m), such that @U=@m  0. Note that
treatingm as music is without loss of generality:m can be anything that can be enjoyed while
making risky choices, say, visual stimuli. A special case of no forecast errors can be thought of
as the fully rational benchmark. That is, subjects choose whether to take risk by maximizing U
(x,m), understanding that whether U(x)> U(x0) depends not only on x and x0, but also on the
value ofm. Now given current musical statem, denote the decision-maker’s prediction of
utility in a musical statem0 6¼m by U^ ðx;m0jmÞ. With full rationality, U^ ðx;m0jmÞ ¼ Uðx;m0Þ.
Allowing prediction errors e, that is, U^ ðx;m0jmÞ ¼ Uðx;m0Þ þ e, is a possible avenue for
integrating more psychology into this model of risk-preference interactions. For example,
the decision-maker might extrapolate from the utility given current musical state, such that
U^ ðx;m0jmÞ > Uðx;m0Þ when U(x,m)> U(x,m0). U could also be made habit dependent such
that experiencing relatively more of a high (low) musical state leads to increasing (decreasing)
risk-taking in all states. These features could be used for modeling a dynamically inconsistent
agent who is subject to more surprises and more volatile preferences compared to the fully
rational benchmark.
Conclusion
Using an experimental setting which involves real money stakes, constant probabilities of win-
ning, and within-subject alteration of the type of background music, we find that hearing one’s
favorite music playing increases risk-taking, and disliked music suppresses risk-taking, com-
pared to a baseline of no music. The difference in acceptance rates in favor of good music is
about 10 percentage points along the diagonal of the payoff matrix.
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We interpret these results as suggesting that preference complementarities extending
beyond the realm of goods and services are possible. Listening to one’s preferred music
increases experienced utility per se, and simultaneously increases the marginal utility of
money. This increases the likelihood of participating in a gamble. Disliked music, on the other
hand, would lead to a marginal utility of taking the gamble that is lower than what prevails
under silence. The preference-based interpretation of the results is supported by recent
research in neuroscience. The activation in the reward areas of the brain are proportional to
subjective ratings of music [25], and the behavioral effect of music on risk-taking co-varies
with brain activation in the amygdala and the dorsal striatum [22]–brain regions known to be
key components of value computations.
Preference complementarities can explain time-varying risk preferences. Earlier studies
have attributed such effects to behavioral bias. We wish to point out that these explanations are
not mutually exclusive, however. How such preference complementarities would arise provides
a topic for future research. Understanding the formation of preferences is a central issue in
many disciplines.
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